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Chapter 11
Housing Markets in Scandinavia: Supply,
Demand and Regulation
Kjersti Næss Torstensen and Kasper Roszbach
This chapter discusses the recent developments in the housing markets of Scandi-
navian capital cities and some of the policy challenges these developments are
bringing about.1 First, we will brieﬂy review some demographic trends, both over
the past 10 years and looking ahead. Next, we will show some statistics on the build-
up of housing supply shortages and what has happened to the price of housing. Then,
drawing on a few recent housing market studies, we will go over the observed and
likely consequences of housing shortages and house prices rises. Finally, we will
discuss the geographical mortgage policy that was implemented in Norway, with
a particular focus on restricting mortgage lending in Oslo a year ago. We conclude
with a few takeaways.
This text is based on a presentation Kasper Roszbach gave at the seminar on “Hot Property: the
housing market in major cities” held at De Nederlandsche Bank onMay 24–25, 2018. The views
expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of Norges
Bank or the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank.
1Because it is hard to get uniform statistics across all dimensions of housing markets in Scandinavia,
we will discuss data for single countries and generalize these to other Scandinavian cities, while
being aware of the limitations of the data. We will, very selectively and in a non-random way, draw
on a number of reports and sources that have investigated the housing market in mostly Norway,
Sweden and Iceland.
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1 Background
Over the past 10 years, several Scandinavian capital regions have experienced a
period of rapid growth. Stockholm’s population grew by about 16%while Oslo grew
at an even faster rate of close to 19%. Although neither of these cities belongs to the
group of European cities that have grown most in absolute terms, like Paris, Madrid
and Rome, the rapid growth rate of these metropolitan areas and the intensity of the
resulting frictions in housing markets pose particular challenges, that we believe
provide generally useful insights into the challenges that cities are confronted with in
the face of rapid expansion.
Metropolitan area population growth in Scandinavia is projected by the European
Commission to continue being robust. Eurostat projections, plotted in Fig. 11.1,
suggest that the Stockholm metropolitan area will grow by close to 50% in the next
30 years, while Oslo will grow by more than 55%. At the same time some other
metropolitan areas in southern and eastern Europe are projected to shrink, while for
example Amsterdam ﬁnds itself in an intermediate position. While projections do not
account for substantial changes that may take place in confounding living conditions,
like reduced affordability due to housing scarcity or severely lagging infrastructure,
they do provide an indication of the challenges these cities may come to face.
Since 2005, the metropolitan area of Stockholm has built up a substantial housing
deﬁcit as the net annual migration rate has been hovering between 10,000 and
20,000 households while construction of new houses and apartments has been
ranging from 7000 to 14,000 units (see Katinic (2018) and Fig. 11.2). The migration
to Stockholm has several drivers. Among other things, there is a tendency to migrate
domestically, away from rural areas. At the national level, Scandinavia and in
particular Sweden, has experienced a large inﬂow of refugees. Net immigration in




































Source: European Commission (2015)
Fig. 11.1 Projected population growth rates metropolitan areas 2016–2050
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metropolitan area has also experienced a housing construction deﬁcit in the period
2006–2016, although not as dramatic as Stockholm. There are some intuitively
appealing explanations for this difference, which we will discuss in the next section.
The shortage of new housing has had its effect on house prices. Although Oslo
and Stockholm recently experienced moderate drops in house prices, both cities
saw house prices more than double in 12 years. Over the same period inner city
Stockholm apartments almost tripled in price and rose by approximately 50% more
than the country average (including Stockholm itself ). Generally, price develop-
ments in metropolitan areas, with predominantly multifamily dwellings, can differ
substantially from more rural areas with mostly single-family houses. Differences in
subletting regulations, as in Sweden where single family house subletting essentially
is unregulated while apartment subletting is highly restricted, have kept up the
supply of single-family houses. This has exerted a dampening effect on price
developments outside metropolitan areas.
In Oslo the corresponding rise in house prices has been a little more muted with a
150% increase and a slightly smaller differential vis-à-vis the rest of the country. The
latter can partially be explained by the fact that oil is an important driver of the
economy and thereby house prices on the west coast of Norway. Figure 11.3
illustrates how west-coast Stavanger experienced a drop in house prices when oil
prices sharply fell in 2015 and 2016, while the rest of the country and was much less












Source: Sveriges Riksbank Financial Stability Report 2017:2
Fig. 11.2 Housing construction versus population growth in Stockholm
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To what extent and how rapidly the supply of housing responds to price ﬂuctu-
ations will among other things depend on the ﬁnancial incentives produced by local
housing regulations. Norway, for example, effectively has had no rent control since
2000 and experienced that new housing starts closely tracked house prices changes
with a lag of up to a year.2
2 Explanations for the Shortage and Rise in Prices
of Housing
There are a number of plausible explanations for the combination of sharply rising
demand and a lagging supply of new houses in Oslo and Stockholm. In particular
Stockholm has faced a shortage of land for housing construction, despite the ample












Sources: Norges Bank Financial Stability Report 2017, updated using data from Eiendomsverdi AS,
www.finn.no and Real Estate Norway
Fig. 11.3 House price changes in metropolitan areas in Norway
2The Norwegian Tenancy Act of 1999 makes it possible for landlords, every third year, to mark up
the rent to an existing rent level of comparable objects—to a “fair” rent. The last part of the old rent
control was removed in 2010, affecting a small number of pre-World-War-II blocks of apartments
in Oslo and Trondheim. The act restricts price increases in ongoing tenancy agreements. Rent
increases on a yearly basis cannot exceed the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). See
Nygaard (2013) for details.
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In Sweden, a recent Ofﬁcial Government Report (2015), the “Long-Term Survey
of the Swedish Economy”, identiﬁes rigid planning processes, building restrictions,
for example noise standards that place certain locations off limits for housing
construction, and building permit appeal procedures as important hurdles for more
rapid house construction. Another friction negatively affecting housing construction
is the mismatch between the budgetary and political responsibility for major infra-
structure investments (central government and provinces) and the planning authority
for housing construction (municipalities).
Rental regulations are also keeping rents on rent controlled apartments low,
which is severely restricting the turnover of apartments because the subsidies
disincentivize people to move to self-owned homes. The same government report
observed that while it is common in many countries for people living in rental
apartments or rental homes to be more ﬂexible on the labor market, Swedes in self-
owned dwellings are actually more mobile than those living in rentals.
On the demand side, a few non-negligible policy changes have spurred housing
demand: In 2007 the wealth tax was abolished while the real estate tax was capped
at approximately 600 euro per year in 2008. Instead, the capital gains taxes were
raised from 20 to 22%. The real estate tax had become a highly unpopular tax after
several elderly people had been forced to leave their houses when they couldn’t
generate the cashﬂow to pay the annual tax, although they had substantial assets.
The ﬁrst two tax reforms freed up assets for housing purchases while the wealth tax
abolishment also made it easier for family members to support each other in
entering the housing market. The increase in the capital gains tax, in an environment
with steep increases in house prices, has likely made people less inclined to move,
in particular after the introduction of the LTV requirement which made cash at hand
more valuable.
Simultaneously several other, secondary, factors are likely to have been at work
in Scandinavia. Tourism to Scandinavia grew briskly over a 10-year period from
2007. In Stockholm overnight stays grew by 50%, in Oslo they increased by 55%
while Iceland had a true tourist boom with a growth rate of 290%.
Part of the growth in tourism has been accompanied by the rise of Airbnb. There
is some research indicating that the activity level of Airbnb can have a signiﬁcant
effect on house and rental prices. Elíasson and Ragnarsson (2018) estimate that
Airbnb rental activity in Reykjavik has led to an additional annual house price
increase of 2%, or 6 in total, over the period 2014–2017. Of all new apartment
construction in Reykjavik in 2016, 50–70% is estimated to be undertaken to replace
houses that have been put up for rent on Airbnb and taken out of the long-term rental
market.
The idea put forward in Elíasson and Ragnarsson is supported by qualitatively
similar ﬁndings for other countries. Barron et al. (2018) estimate for the U.S. that in
zip code areas with the median owner-occupancy rate (72%), a 1% growth of Airbnb
listings leads to a 0.018% rise in the rental rate and a 0.026% increase in house
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prices.3 A study for The Netherlands (ING Bank 2016) estimated that house prices in
Amsterdam may have increased permanently by 2–4% because the rental income
home owners collect can be used to obtain larger mortgages.
Other factors that may have contributed to an already upward trend in Scandina-
via are a safe haven effect after the sovereign debt crisis, the low interest rates and a
shift in credit standards. Sweden, for example, gradually moved from a system with
unregulated but “conventional” downpayments and regular amortizations into a
system without or with very low downpayments or amortizations.4
A sharp rise in house prices, possibly followed by a steep downturn, can lead to
generational differences in wealth effects and can produce random winners and
losers in housing markets. This eventually can have other unforeseen and undesir-
able side effects. A recent paper by Haughwout et al. (2018) shows how temporary
shifts in lending standards are likely to be the driving force behind the fall in home
ownerships among the young in the US since the ﬁnancial crisis. Because of the
recent rise in house prices, this has also led to young households missing out on
wealth accumulation and future collateral for lending.
3 Policy Options
To address both the structural frictions in housing markets as well as the conse-
quences of rapidly rising house prices, economic policymakers have several options
available to them.
With respect to structural policies, Bergendahl et al. (2015) suggest that making
large infrastructural investments conditional on beneﬁciary municipalities commit-
ting to local housing construction can mitigate the misalignment of incentives
between different layers of government. Building permit processes, which are
often slow and prone to lengthy appeals, can also be made more efﬁcient. More
ﬂexibility can be introduced into the regulated rental market and the market for
subletting, for example by allowing for longer periods of subletting or by incentiv-
izing renters to move to the non-regulated sector when their income situation
improves.
Structural policies are most likely to provide long-term solutions to structural
changes, such as a change in housing demand. They can, however, also take years
from decision to actual delivery and are therefore unlikely to alleviate frictions in the
short or medium run. Fiscal and credit market policies can then complement
structural policies by providing quicker relief to credit and housing markets.
3They also ﬁnd that the effect of Airbnb listings on rental rates and house prices is decreasing in the
owner-occupancy rate.
4Recently, an amortization policy was introduced that implies mandatory amortization for bor-
rowers with a high LTV.
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On the ﬁscal side, tax incentives for households to assume debt can be lessened
by limiting interest rate deductibility, while lock-in effects of capital gains taxes can
be mitigated by allowing for a deferral of tax payments. Reducing interest rate
deductibility does not, however, necessarily reduce the fragility of households or
the affordability of housing, while it does lead to a complicated wealth transfer from
older to younger generations. The prime advantage of a change in the ﬁscal treatment
of mortgage debt is therefore likely to be that alternative investment forms receive a
more equal treatment.
Credit market policies can be employed to protect consumers and ﬁnancial
institutions against excessive leverage and risk stemming from concentrated expo-
sure to mortgage lending and housing collateral. Borrowing constraints, such as a
debt-to-income ratio, and mandatory amortization can reduce indebtedness and the
risk of a mortgage default. Loan-to-value (LTV) ratios can be used to limit the risk
to banks if a default occurs. Typically, LTV’s are less effective in restricting
mortgage lending, unless they are allowed to vary over the cycle. Agarwal et al.
(2014) show that counseling consumers about mortgage risks and alternatives can
sometimes be an effective tool to mitigate mortgage risk and show evidence from a
US policy experiment that led lower risk mortgage applicants to choose safer
mortgage contracts.
4 An Example of a Macroprudential Policy Measure
Finally, we will provide some more details on a recently adopted macroprudential
policy in Norway that generally restricted mortgage lending and imposed additional
restrictions on lending in Oslo.
In 2015, as house prices in Oslo were rising at a rate of more than 10% per year,
the Norwegian government imposed an 85% LTV requirement (see Table 11.1). The
LTV was accompanied by a 5% interest rate stress test requirement, implying that
borrowers should be able to repay their loans if the interest rate rises by 5%. A
mandatory annual amortization of 2.5% for mortgages with an LTV over 70% was
introduced as well.5 Each bank was allowed an exemption quota which permits a
bank to grant loans that breach one or more of the policy requirements for up to 10%
of its quarterly mortgage volume.
In January 2017 these requirements were tightened and complemented with a
debt-to-income requirement (DTI) of ﬁve times gross income while amortization
was made mandatory for mortgages with an LTV exceeding 60%. For second
dwellings in Oslo, which in principle are buy-to-let, the new policy set a stricter
LTV of 60%. For new mortgages with collateral in Oslo, the exemption quota was
tightened to 8%.
5In December 2011 the same rules were introduced as “Guidelines to prudent mortgage lending” by
the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway.
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Figure 11.4 shows that the policy has had a substantial impact on the share of
loans that exceed the DTI, fail the stress test requirement or do not amortize at the
prescribed rate. The share of loans with a DTI in excess of ﬁve fell from 9% in 2016
to less than 2% in 2017, less than 1% of mortgages failed the stress test in 2017
Table 11.1 Mortgage restrictions in Norway 2015–2018
Requirement June 2015 Jan 2017—June 2018 July 2018—Dec 2019
Max. loan-to-value (LTV) 85% 85% 85%
Debt servicing possible with
interest rate increase of
5 p.p. 5 p.p. 5 p.p.
Maximum debt-to-income
(DTI)





For LTVs above 60% For LTVs above 60%
Regional requirements Max. LTV 60% for
secondary dwellings
in Oslo



























Source: Borchgrevink and Næss Torstensen (2018)
Fig. 11.4 Mortgage policy breaches in Norway 2015–2018. For 2014–2016 we assume the 2017
mortgage policy already applied and calculate what share of all loans would have been in excess of
each criterion
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(2016: 4%) and less than 4% of mortgages with an LTV over 60% amortized at a rate
of below 2.5% (2016: 7%).6 A more granular breakdown of the data shows that these
effects have been strongest among younger borrowers.
Because the 2017 policy change appears to have been most binding with respect
to the DTI, we have taken a closer look at how geographical variation in the exposure
to the DTI constraint has affected house price development (Borchgrevink and
Torstensen 2018). When we sort residential areas by the share of loans that was
given in excess of the DTI policy in 2014, and subtract each area’s local exemption
quota, we see in Fig. 11.5 that a clear negative relation exists between the share of
“high” DTI loans and the price development in 2016–2017.7 In 2017 house prices
rose by 4.7% less in “exposed” areas than in non-exposed areas. When we control
for “fundamental” differences between regions (unemployment, the supply of new
houses et cetera), the size of the effects falls to 2.3%. If we exclude municipalities
in the Oslo area (the white dots), the effect falls to 1.7% but remains statistically
signiﬁcant.
At the same time house sales have not been affected in any greater way, except for
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House price change 2017 (rest of country, in percent, vertical axis)
House price change 2017 (Oslo, in percent, vertical axis)
Source: Borchgrevink and Næss Torstensen (2018)
Fig. 11.5 House price changes and “exposure” to the DTI lending restriction. Exposure is
measured as the percentage of households “with a DTI greater than ﬁve” that exceeds the exemption
quota (“speed limit”). Blue dots are residential areas in greater Oslo, black dots are residential areas
in the rest of the country
6For 2016 we assume “hypothetical” breaches of the requirements, i.e., we assume the policy
already applied, and calculated what share of all loans was in excess of these criteria in one or more
dimensions.
7We classify an area as exposed if the share of loans with a DTI greater than ﬁve exceeded the
exemption quota of that region (10%, but 8% in Oslo).
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DTI greater than 5 had been high. We are also observing that the negative relation
between the regional share of mortgages with a DTI above ﬁve and mortgage
debt increases in 2017 has been particularly large for households in the age range
20–40.
These preliminary data show that the Norwegian mortgage policy likely damp-
ened house price development and mortgage debt growth in regions with initially
high debt levels and with more borrowers impacted by the policy. This could be
indicative of a reduction in both riskier second house purchases and riskier lending/
borrowing.
On June 18, 2018, the government decided to extend the mortgage policy by
another year and a half, until December 31, 2019.8
5 Conclusions
Scandinavian capitals have grown fast and are projected to be among the fastest
growing cities in Europe in the next decades. Rising house demand has not been
matched by construction over a longer time period. Taxes, regulation and lack/
mismatch of incentives to build have been identiﬁed as the main frictions. Growth
in tourism, low interest rates, a safe haven effect and credit “innovation” have likely
contributed to house price rises. In markets with fewer frictions, leveraged invest-
ments have taken place in secondary housing for rent.
The mismatch between housing supply and demand can have several
negative side effects, including unintended wealth transfers between generations.
Structural policies are ﬁrst best solutions to address mostly structural frictions.
Macroprudential policies, such as a mortgage policy, can mitigate some of these
side effects.
A more tempered growth rate of house prices can be beneﬁcial to housing market
entrants. Macroprudential policies can therefore complement structural policies. A
preliminary assessment of a policy to restrict the demand for housing credit in Oslo
displays signs of success.
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8The government made a few adjustments to the mortgage regulations, by allowing banks to include
documented and stable tax-free income, such as child allowance, in the calculation of the DTI and
funds in a “tax deduction for young people’s housing savings” (BSU) account as equity in
calculating the LTV.
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